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INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") grants federal courts jurisdiction to
hear civil claims brought by aliens for torts committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' This peculiar law has
opened courtroom doors to lawsuits brought by non-U.S. citizens for
international law violations perpetrated around the world. Indeed, as the
Second Circuit once stated, it is "a jurisdictional provision unlike any
other in American law and of a kind apparently unknown to any other
legal system in the world."2
Although the First Congress adopted the statute in 1789 as part of
the Judiciary Act, it went largely unused for about 170 years.3 The First
Congress, concerned with its "inability to 'cause infractions of treaties,
or of the law of nations to be punished,"' originally enacted the ATS to
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2008, New York
Univeristy. I would like to thank Professor Markus Wagner for his guidance.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2013) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 115-16.
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enforce the law of nations domestically.4 A lack of drafting history,
however, and the brevity of the text of the statute itself have given courts
an opportunity to interpret what the ATS means and how it was meant to
be used.5 Judge Friendly highlighted this point when he called the stat-
ute "a legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judi-
ciary Act ... no one seems to know whence it came."6
After years of nonuse, the ATS experienced a revival in 1980 when
the Second Circuit took jurisdiction over a suit brought by Paraguayan
citizens against a Paraguayan Inspector General of Police for human
rights abuses in contravention of international law.7 From then on, the
ATS became a means by which human rights abuse victims would seek
civil redress for their injuries. And as litigation of human rights viola-
tions under the ATS continued after Filartiga, so too did the group of
defendants that plaintiffs sought to hold accountable expand.8 From state
actors, to private individuals, to corporations, plaintiffs sought to cast
the ATS net farther and wider, seeking compensation for their wrongs
and recognition of the fact that human rights abuses are not committed
by state actors alone, but also by private individuals and corporations.
After Filartiga, most courts faced with these new types of defend-
ants would uphold jurisdiction and find that they could be liable for their
alleged wrongs.9 The opinions, however, failed to fully explain their
conclusions. With the statute itself silent on the classes of defendants it
contemplated," ° judges were free to interpret and explain exactly how
liability arose under the ATS. And while these opinions incorporated
new classes of defendants into the statute's reach, they failed to draw a
4. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004) (citing J. Madison, JouRNtAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)).
5. See Mara Theophila, "Moral Monsters" Under the Bed: Holding Corporations
Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2863 (2011).
6. liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116 ("in
1980, the statute was given new life, when our Court first recognized in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
that the ATS provides jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2) brought by afiens (only), (3) for
violations of the law of nations ... including, as a general matter, war crimes and crimes against
humanity-crimes in which the perpetrator can be called 'hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind."' (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890)).
8. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (claims brought against a state official); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (claims brought against a private individual); Kiobel, 621 F.3d at
117 (claims brought against corporations).
9. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (finding that the ATS provides jurisdiction over a claim against
a state official); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (finding that the ATS provides jurisdiction over a claim
against a private individual); Romero v. Drummond, 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)
(finding that the ATS provides jurisdiction over a claim against a corporation).
10. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1988)
("The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants ....").
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link between the given defendant's obligation to uphold international
law norms and liability under the ATS." The absence of this link would
prove crucial to the development of a Circuit split on whether corpora-
tions can be tried as ATS defendants. 2
On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit rejected corporate lia-
bility under the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co..' 3 By
doing so, the Second Circuit split from other courts that had previously
upheld jurisdiction over corporate ATS cases.14 The Second Circuit
drew from its own precedent and from a footnote in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 5 the only Supreme Court decision on the ATS, to find that
liability under the statute is governed by international law. The Court
held that, because no norm of customary international law holds corpo-
rations liable for human rights violations, the ATS does not provide
jurisdiction over such claims.
16
This holding elicited a backlash of subsequent Circuit court deci-
sions upholding corporate liability under the ATS.'7 The Circuit split
exposed a choice of law debate among the courts that centers on whether
international or domestic law should govern liability. 8 One side of the
11. Professor Kenneth Anderson described this issue in terms of a "hinge" under the ATS.
See Kenneth Anderson, Extra Thoughts on Today's 2nd Circuit ATS Decision, OPINIO JURIS (Sept.
17, 2010, 10:49 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-
decision/. He claimed the statute contains a threshold part and a substantive part, and that the
question plaguing courts is "whether the threshold that serves as a hinge to swing over to connect
and kick start the substantive part of the ATS, so to speak, the US domestic tort law substance,
must be international law." Id. Similarly, Mara Theophila opined that "the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the ATS [in Kiobel] unjustifiably conflates the threshold question of what
constitutes a violation with the secondary issue of who can be held liable under the statute."
Theophila, supra note 5, at 2862. See also id. at 2902-04. This Note reclassifies the issue
addressed by Anderson and Theophila as a gap in ATS jurisprudence between a defendant's
obligation to uphold international law norms and a defendant's liability under the statute. This
Note provides a close reading of ATS case law in order to demonstrate how the gap was first
posited in the Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga and continued throughout ATS jurisprudence.
Rather than continuing the gap, the Kiobel decision instead attempted to fill it by applying
international law to determine liability under the ATS. See infra Part I.B.
12. See Joseph G. Finnerty III et al., CIRCUIT SPLIT WIDENS Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 53 No. 11 DRI For Def. 78 (2011). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit furthered
the Circuit split by upholding corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671
F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
13. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
14. See, e.g. Romero v. Drummond, 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). See also Frank Cruz-
Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, The Second Circuit Correctly Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1109, 1109 n.6 (2011) (listing cases prior to Kiobel that
upheld jurisdiction over corporate defendants).
15. 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004).
16. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.
17. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d I I (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
See also infra Part III.
18. The choice of law debate under the ATS had been brewing before Kiobel for some time.
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debate, like the court in Kiobel, would apply international law to deter-
mine whether corporations can be sued, while the other would resolve
the issue by applying domestic law. Using different interpretations of
precedent and the footnote from Sosa, each post-Kiobel decision upheld
jurisdiction over ATS claims against corporate defendants. While each
court reached the same holding, some determined corporate liability by
using international law while others applied domestic.
This Note will explore the development of the Circuit split over
corporate liability under the ATS. Part I will track how ATS decisions
prior to Kiobel adjudicated liability under the statute without ever truly
addressing it. By leaving room for future judges to interpret the ATS to
either include or exclude corporate liability, these decisions paved the
way for the aforementioned choice of law debate. More specifically, Part
I will explain how two key cases from the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa failed to locate a defendant's liability
in either international or domestic law. Each decision explained the
defendant's international law obligation and upheld liability under the
ATS, but left gaps in its reasoning by failing to draw a link between the
two.
Part II will explore the current Circuit split, starting with an analy-
sis of the Eleventh Circuit's take on corporate liability before contrasting
it with the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel. Part III analyzes the
backlash against Kiobel in the District of Columbia, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits. Part IV then applies a theory of legal interpretation as a frame-
work for explaining how the Circuit courts were able to reach such dif-
ferent holdings on corporate liability by reading their own policy into
precedent and their interpretations of Sosa's murky footnote.
On October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Kiobel to review the corporate liability question.19 This Note concludes
in Part V with a suggestion that the Supreme Court should now explic-
itly fill the gap in ATS case law by linking a defendant's obligations
under international law to its liability under the ATS with domestic law.
Domestic law holds corporations accountable for their torts,20 and the
See generally Willam R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies For Violations
of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635 (2006); Chim~ne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing
Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008); Odette Murray et al., Exaggerated
Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case of
Kiobel, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 57 (2011).
19. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
20. See Doe, 654 F.3d at 57 ("Given that the law of every jurisdiction in the United States and
of every civilized nation, and the law of numerous international treaties, provide that corporations
are responsible for their torts, it would create a bizarre anomaly to immunize corporations from
liability for the conduct of their agents in lawsuits brought for 'shockingly egregious violations of
[Vol. 67:705
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ATS should be no exception. Answering the choice of law debate in
favor of corporate liability gives victims of human rights violations
worldwide a forum for redress and positions the United States as a
leader in the human rights field.
I. INTERPRETING A DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS-
HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT GOT TO KIOBEL
A. Beginning in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
The current Circuit split over corporate liability can be traced back
to the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.2 Filartiga
revived litigation under the ATS and led courts to expound upon differ-
ent issues under the statute that had never before been addressed.22 The
Filartiga Court's description of a plaintiff and defendant's rights and
obligations under the ATS laid the foundation for future disagreement
among the courts about corporate liability.
The Filartigas, citizens of Paraguay, brought suit under the ATS
against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, in his individual capacity, for the
wrongful death of their son, Joelito.23 The Filartigas claimed that Pena-
Irala, a Paraguayan police official, caused Joelito's wrongful death
through the use of torture.24 As such, the Filartigas sought to hold him
civilly liable under the ATS for a tort in violation of the law of nations.25
The Second Circuit upheld jurisdiction, finding the plaintiffs had
alleged a violation of "established norms of the international law of
human rights, and hence the law of nations," namely, deliberate torture
by a government official.26 Where no treaty is implicated, the Court
found that established norms of the law of nations were to serve as the
standard against which a defendant's tortious conduct would be mea-
sured.2 7 If a defendant transgressed a rule of international law, the Court
could take jurisdiction. The Second Circuit thus required a violation of
universally recognized principles of international law."' (citing Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691,
692 (2d Cir. 1983))).
21. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. See Geoffrey Pariza, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to Violations of International
Law After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 Loy. U. CH. INT'L L. REV. 229, 232 (2010-2011)
("The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which has been at the forefront of almost all significant
ATS litigation, breathed new life into the ATS in 1980 with its seminal case, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, where it held that deliberate torture under the color of law violated universally accepted
norms and was against the law of nations.").
23. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79.
24. Id. at 879.
25. Id. at 878-79.
26. Id. at 880.
27. Id. at 880-81.
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"well-established, universally recognized norms of international law"28
as the basis for jurisdiction under the ATS.
The Court turned to sources of international law to determine
whether deliberate torture by a government official violated an estab-
lished norm of the law of nations.29 Because the law of nations changes
and evolves over time, the Court used sources to "interpret international
law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations of the world today."3 Conduct constituting a violation of the
law of nations under the ATS would change over time because custom-
ary international law standards would continue to develop through the
centuries. After scanning the sources of international law, the Court
found that "there are few, if any, issues in international law today on
which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power
to torture persons held in custody."'"
In its analysis of international law sources, the Court shifted
between a discussion of the rights of individuals in international law to
be free from torture, the obligation on states in international law to
refrain from violating these rights, and the norms of international law
against which a defendant's conduct must be measured. The Court found
universal agreement that "international law confers fundamental rights
upon all people vis-A-vis their governments,"32 and that "the right to be
free from torture,"33 as promoted by the United Nations Charter and
explicitly granted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is one
of them. The Court further found a corresponding obligation on states to
refrain from torture, as evidenced by United Nations Declarations.34
Together, the right to be free from torture and the concomitant obliga-
tion on states to respect that right make up a norm of customary interna-
tional law that prohibits the official use of torture.35 The Court found
further evidence of this rule in "numerous international treaties and
accords" and in the "constitutions of over fifty-five nations."36
In sum, the Court's jurisdictional analysis identified a plaintiff's
right under international law and a corresponding international law obli-
gation on states. Together, these elements constitute a norm of the law of
nations actionable under the ATS. 37 The Court, however, failed to clar-
28. Id. at 888.
29. Id. at 880-81.
30. Id. at 881.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 885.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 883.
35. Id. at 884.
36. Id. at 883-84.
37. Sosa later confirmed this jurisdictional analysis. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
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ify whether a defendant's liability arises from international or domestic
law. More specifically, the Court failed to link the obligation on states
under international law to refrain from torture to the liability of Pena-
Irala as a defendant under the ATS. While international law prohibits
officially perpetrated torture, Pena-Irala would be liable in his individual
capacity. But from where exactly did Pena-Irala's liability for torture
arise?
In the beginning of the opinion, the Court held "that deliberate tor-
ture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights."38 The Court
then never addressed whether or how international law extends the same
obligation that it places on states to state actors individually. The only
mention of an individual's responsibility for official torture is the U.N.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture.3 9 The Declaration defines torture as "any act by which severe
pain of suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
by or at the instigation of a public official" and provides that victims of
torture must have "redress and compensation in accordance with
national law" when an act of torture "has been committed by or at the
instigation of a public official."4
While the U.N. Declaration includes public officials in its defini-
tion of torture, the obligation to refrain from that act is ultimately on
member states, which must provide a remedy under domestic law for
torture committed by their public officials.4 " The Second Circuit's hold-
ing that the prohibition against official torture is a "well-established,
universally recognized" standard of customary international law is there-
fore not equivalent to a finding that customary international law imposes
liability on individual state officials for acts of torture. Customary inter-
national law imposes that liability on states themselves. At the same
time, however, the Court did not explain whether domestic or interna-
tional law governs liability.
692, 725 (2004) ("[Wie think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized."). See also Theophila, supra note 5, at 2867-68 ("The [Sosa] decision put to rest the
question of which body of law-international or domestic-should guide the inquiry of what
constitutes a violation of the law of nations in an ATS lawsuit.").
38. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 882-83.
40. Id. at 883-84 (citing the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034
(1975)).
41. Id. at 882-83 ("The Declaration expressly prohibits any state from permitting the
dastardly and totally inhuman act of torture.").
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In Kiobel, the Second Circuit would later find that a defendant's
liability under the ATS must derive from an established norm of custom-
ary international law.42 The Court would then decline jurisdiction by
holding that international law places no liability on corporations.43 As
one article noted, however, "[h]ad the Filartiga Court asked itself
whether any international tribunal had ever held an individual liable -
whether civilly or criminally - for committing torture, it would have
found no such examples at that time."''4 This proposition sheds light on
Filartiga's failure to address whether liability derives from domestic or
international law. Does the fact that there was no international tribunal
available to hold an individual defendant liable for torture at the time
mean that there was also no corresponding customary international law
rule? If so, would it have mattered to the Court at all whether customary
international law extended this prohibition to state actors individually?
The Court did not answer these questions, but the Supreme Court must
now do so explicitly when it decides Kiobel.
B. Private Actor Liability in Kadic v. Karadzic
In 1995, the Second Circuit issued another influential ATS opinion
in Kadic v. Karadzic.45 After addressing state actor liability in Filartiga,
the Court next faced the question of whether a private individual could
be liable under the ATS.46 By answering this question in the affirmative,
without distinguishing whether private actor liability derives from
domestic or international law, Kadic contributed to future disagreement
among the Circuit courts over corporate liability.47
The plaintiffs, victims of human rights atrocities committed by the
Bosnian-Serb military forces during the Bosnian civil war, sued
Karadzic, President of the Bosnian-Serb republic and commander of the
military forces, in his individual capacity under the ATS.48 The plaintiffs
claimed they had sustained injuries "committed as part of a pattern of
systematic human rights violations directed by Karadzic and carried out
by the military forces under his command. '49 Specifically, they claimed
that Karadzic was liable for "brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution,
42. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 130 (2d Cir. 2010).
43. Id. at 148-49.
44. Murray et al., supra note 18, at 76.
45. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
46. Id. at 236.
47. Compare Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Kadic in
support of its holding of corporate liability under the ATS) with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Kadic in support of its denial of corporate liability
under the ATS).
48. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
49. Id. at 237.
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forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution, carried out by the
Bosnian-Serb military forces" during the war.5" In holding that private
actors could be liable for certain violations of international law, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the District Court's finding that a remedy under the
ATS requires state action and that, because the Bosnian-Serb military
faction was not a state, it could not be liable.51
The Court began its analysis of private actor liability by referring to
three requirements for federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS:
"(1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of
nations (i.e., international law)."52 In light of this framework, the Court
first phrased the question presented as "whether some violations of the
law of nations may be remedied when committed by those not acting
under the authority of a state,"'5 3 but then later rephrased it as "whether
the plaintiffs have pleaded violations of international law."'54 By reword-
ing the question presented, the Court effectively sidestepped the ques-
tion of whether a defendant's liability derives from international or
domestic law. The first phrasing suggests that the issue is whether
domestic law holds private individuals liable to remedy violations of the
law of nations. The second phrasing suggests that the issue is whether
international law holds private actors liable for violations of its norms,
thereby giving rise to a "violation of the law of nations" actionable
under the ATS.55 In the end, the Court would answer neither directly.
The Court examined different sources to answer the private actor
liability question, and ultimately found that "certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the
auspices of a state or only as private individuals. '5 6 The Court first cited
case law and William Blackstone to show how piracy is an "example of
the application of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals."5"
The work of other academic scholars is cited as evidence that prohibi-
tions against slave trade and war crimes have also been applied to pri-
vate individuals,58 and a 1795 opinion of Attorney General Bradford
further found that the ATS could remedy violations of customary inter-
national law committed by private persons.59
Next, the Court looked to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
50. Id. at 236-37.
51. Id. at 237.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Id. at 236.
54. Id. at 238.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2013).
56. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 239-40.
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tions Law, which states that "[i]ndividuals may be held liable for
offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and geno-
cide."' 6° This section of the Restatement discusses entities that are con-
sidered persons under international law, meaning those that have "have
legal status, personality, rights, and duties under international law and
whose acts and relationships are the principal concerns of international
law. '61 The Court then cited § 404 of the Restatement: "A state has
jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses rec-
ognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as
piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism. .".. ,,62 The Court reasoned
that the inclusion of crimes such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide in
this section shows that "offenses of 'universal concern' include those
capable of being committed by non-state actors."'63 Thus, a state can
create domestic law remedies, such as the ATS, for violations of cus-
tomary international law capable of being committed by private actors.6 4
The Court then analyzed each alleged human rights abuse (geno-
cide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution) to determine whether
international law has attributed responsibility to private actors for each.
The Court determined that "the proscription of genocide has applied
equally to state and non-state actors ' 65 and that "the liability of private
individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized since World
War I and was confirmed after World War 1.1 ' 66 For support of its find-
ing on genocide, the Court cited U.N. Resolutions declaring genocide a
crime under international law, "whether the perpetrators are 'private
individuals, public officials or statesmen"' and affirming Article 6 of the
Agreement and Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribu-
nal, which punished individual offenders.67 The Court also cited the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, which extended punishment to private individuals, and the Geno-
cide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, which criminalized
genocide "without regard to whether the offender is acting under color
of law."68
60. Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (2011)).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. II, introductory note (2011).
62. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 404 (2011)).
63. Id. at 240.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 242.
66. Id. at 243.
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For war crimes, the Court looked to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, "which binds parties to internal conflicts regard-
less of whether they are recognized nations or roving hordes of insur-
gents."69  Because international law prohibits individuals from
committing genocide and war crimes, Karadzic could be liable under the
ATS. The torture and summary execution claims were also actionable
"to the extent that they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war
crimes.""
One judge ruling on corporate liability later cited Kadic for its dis-
tinction in international law between norms that extend their reach to the
conduct of private actors and those that are limited to the conduct of
states.7 Under the ATS, international law comes into play only when
deciding if the defendant's conduct can amount to an actionable viola-
tion of the law of nations. Domestic law, however, governs liability.
Because corporations are private actors, domestic law would hold them
liable for their tortious conduct to the same extent as private individu-
als.72 As such, Kadic can be read as supporting corporate liability under
the ATS. The Second Circuit in Kiobel, however, would later cite Kadic
as supporting its rejection of corporate liability.73 Kiobel found that
Kadic looked solely to international law to determine private actor liabil-
ity.74 The Kiobel Court therefore offered Kadic in support of its theory
that an international law rule of corporate liability is a prerequisite to
jurisdiction in corporate ATS cases.
The Kadic opinion allows for such diametrically opposed readings
because the Court never defined which law governs liability under the
ATS. The Court searched international law to determine whether certain
forms of conduct were violations of the law of nations when performed
by private, as opposed to state, actors. The Court, however, never
revealed where liability derived. This failure is evident from the sources
cited. The Court quoted works that frame private actor liability as a rem-
edy governed by domestic law, but simultaneously used sources that
uphold private actor liability under international law. Furthermore, while
the Court questioned whether international law proscriptions might
extend to private individuals, it concurrently asked whether individuals
had been punished under international law for violations of those pro-
scriptions. The Second Circuit's failure to situate a defendant's liability
69. Id. at 243.
70. Id. at 244.
71. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also infra Part
III.A.
72. Doe, 654 F.3d at 50-51.
73. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 11!, 128-30 (2d Cir. 2010).
74. Id. at 130.
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in Kadic thus left ample room for different readings of corporate liability
in future ATS cases.
C. Continuing to Overlook Liability in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The first ATS case to reach the Supreme Court prior to Kiobel was
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, decided in 2004.7' Alvarez-Machain ("Alva-
rez"), a Mexican national, brought suit against Sosa, a Mexican national
hired by the DEA to seize Alvarez, alleging false arrest in violation of
the law of nations and seeking damages under the ATS.76 Sosa settled
the question of whether the ATS is merely a jurisdictional statute,
"addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a
certain subject" or one that creates or authorizes the courts to create a
"right of action without further congressional action. ' 77 The Court held
that the statute is "only jurisdictional," but that Congress enacted it "on
the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action
for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time."78 At the time of its enactment, these
violations included a "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy," as identified by William Blackstone
in 1769 in reference to the "three specific offenses against the law of
nations addressed by the criminal law of England. 79
The Court further found that actionable violations of the law of
nations under the ATS can be expanded beyond these three original
offenses, but that each violation must "rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms. ' 80 The Court
thus set a "standard or set of standards for assessing the particular claim"
raised by any plaintiff by defining the level of specificity that a norm of
international law would have to reach in order to be actionable under the
ATS. 8' Claims for violations of any international law norm must have
"as definite content and acceptance among civilized nations" as the three
offenses originally offered by Blackstone.82 Other Circuit Court deci-
sions had confirmed this point and had found that "for purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before
75. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
76. Id. at 698.
77. Id. at 714.
78. Id. at 711, 724.
79. Id. at 715.
80. Id. at 725.
81. Id. at 731.
82. Id. at 732.
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him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."83
The Court opined in a footnote, which would later become contro-
versial in corporate liability cases, that "[a] related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of
a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual."84 Footnote twenty then went
on to compare Judge Edwards' concurrence in Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, which found "insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by
private actors violates international law," to Kadic, which found "suffi-
cient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates interna-
tional law."85
Much like the Second Circuit in Filartiga and Kadic, the Supreme
Court first looked to the current state of international law to determine
whether the plaintiff had pled a "'specific, universal, and obligatory'"
norm of international law sufficient to constitute an actionable violation
by the defendant.86 The Court thus looked to international law sources to
determine whether arbitrary arrest violated a norm of customary interna-
tional law.87
Alvarez offered two international agreements, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights ("Declaration") and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in support of his proposed rule of interna-
tional law prohibiting arbitrary arrest by a government official.88 The
Court rejected this rule and stated both that "the Declaration does not of
its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law" and
that "the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understand-
ing that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts."89
Alvarez then turned to other sources of customary international
law, including a survey of national constitutions, a decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice ("ICJ"), and authority from the federal courts
for support of a rule against arbitrary arrest9" (also referred to by the
Court as "officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to
detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the
circumstances"). 91 The Court also rejected this assertion, finding the rule
83. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 732 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733-37.
88. Id. at 734.
89. Id. at 734-35.
90. Id. at 734-35, 736 n.27.
91. Id. at 736.
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too broad.92
While Kiobel would later state that Sosa instructs lower courts to
look to "customary international law to determine both whether certain
conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the scope of liability under
the ATS extends to the defendant being sued," the Supreme Court's
analysis of international law sources suggests that a different reading of
Sosa is also possible.93 While the Supreme Court analyzed whether a
prohibition against officially sanctioned arbitrary arrest was a norm of
customary international law, it never addressed the defendant's liability
in relation to this norm. From the opinion, it is clear that the Court
searched international law to determine whether Sosa's conduct violated
the law of nations. It is not clear, however, if Sosa's potential liability
under the ATS would derive from a parallel liability under customary
international law or whether domestic law would govern.
If, as Kiobel would have it, courts are to look in international law
for a rule extending liability to the perpetrator being sued, it seems that
Sosa would have addressed whether customary international law had
ever held state officials liable for arbitrary arrest. As one article put it,
"[i]f the majority in Kiobel are correct, and the only violations of inter-
national law actionable under the ATS are international crimes, then the
Supreme Court could have been much more succinct in its dismissal of
Alvarez-Machain's claim in Sosa: there is no crime of arbitrary deten-
tion or deprivation of liberty in international law (except perhaps in the
context of war)."94 The Kiobel Court's conclusion that "international
law, and not domestic law, governs the scope of liability for violations
of customary international law under the ATS" ignores this
interpretation.95
The Supreme Court's use of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law further illustrates the gap in its analysis. The Court cited
§ 702: "a state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, condones ...prolonged arbitrary detention." 96
The Court then explained that "[a]ny credible invocation of a principle
against arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as binding
customary international law requires a factual basis beyond relatively
brief detention in excess of positive authority. 97 The Court thus implied
that if Sosa's arbitrary detention had been more extreme, he could have
92. Id. ("Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding
customary norm today.").
93. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 128 (2d Cir. 2010).
94. Murray et al., supra note 18, at 83.
95. Id. at 126.
96. Id. at 737 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (2011)).
97. Id.
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been liable under the ATS. Because the international law obligations
discussed in the Restatement run to states, however, it is unclear where
the Court would have derived liability.
II. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM Co. AND THE CURRENT
CIRCUIT SPLIT
The three cases discussed in Part I provide a background against
which the Kiobel Court rendered its decision on corporate liability. Far
from a settled understanding of the ATS, these decisions failed to locate
a defendant's liability in either international or domestic law. The gap in
these opinions has been exposed in subsequent Circuit court cases on
corporate liability, as courts struggled to resolve the issue. Part A of this
section analyzes two Eleventh Circuit cases as an example of contrast to
the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel. These two decisions largely pre-
sumed corporate liability and thus avoided the issue altogether. Part B of
this section addresses the majority opinion in Kiobel, and how the Court
seized upon gaps in ATS jurisprudence to reject corporate liability. By
doing so, the Court went directly against its own precedent and that of
other Circuit courts, such as the Eleventh, which had previously upheld
corporate liability.98 Kiobel thus marked the beginning of the Circuit
split on corporate liability that would eventually lead to the Supreme
Court.
A. Corporate Liability in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit upheld corporate liability under the ATS in
two recent cases, both decided before Kiobel.99 Romero and Sinal-
trainal both found that corporations could be liable under the ATS by
relying either on the text of the statute, precedent, and/or a state actor/
private actor distinction drawn from Kadic. By relying on these argu-
ments, the Eleventh Circuit effectively presumed corporate liability and
avoided a thorough analysis of the issue. Much like the previous Second
Circuit decisions and the Supreme Court decision in Sosa, the Eleventh
Circuit evaded the question of whether a defendant's liability is gov-
erned by international or domestic law.
In Romero, a Colombian trade union, its leaders, and relatives of its
deceased leaders sued Drummond Co., a Colombian subsidiary of a coal
mining company in Alabama, its parent company, and executives (here-
98. See Cruz-Alvarez & Wade, supra note 14, at 1109 n.6 (listing pre-Kiobel decisions
upholding corporate liability).
99. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (lth Cir. 2008); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola
Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (1lth Cir. 2009).
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inafter referred to as "Drummond").1 °° The plaintiffs alleged that Drum-
mond had violated international law by hiring Colombian paramilitary
operatives to torture and kill its union leaders and sought to hold the
corporation liable for damages under the ATS.' 0 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected Drummond's argument against corporate liability, finding that
the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. 102
To support this holding, the Court stated that "[t]he text of the
Alien Tort Statute provides no express exception for corporations," 
10 3
and pointed to precedent, including Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
Inc.. 10 As one commentator reveals, however, "[t]he Aldana court sim-
ply assumed that a corporate entity could be held liable without any
discussion of the issue. '  The Eleventh Circuit in Romero thus upheld
corporate liability by relying on a case that merely presumed it. As such,
Romero simply failed to locate the source of an ATS defendant's
liability.
The Eleventh Circuit again upheld corporate liability in Sinal-
trainal1 0 6 The plaintiffs, trade union leaders, sued their employers, bot-
tling companies in Colombia and Coca-Cola companies allegedly
connected to these employers (hereinafter referred to as "Coca-Cola"),
alleging that Coca-Cola had conspired with Colombian paramilitary
forces to torture and murder them." 7 Although the Court affirmed the
District Court's dismissal because the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled
state action, 10 8 the opinion nonetheless made it clear that corporations
could liable under the ATS. 109
In its analysis of corporate liability, the Court relied on precedent,
as it did in Romero, but also looked to a private actor/state actor distinc-
tion drawn from the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic. The Court first
stated that early ATS cases involved state actors, "but subsequent cases
have expanded the scope of the ATS to impose liability on private indi-
100. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1308-09.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1315.
103. Id.
104. Id. ("the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints of
torture against corporate defendants").
105. Theophila, supra note 5, at 2882; see also Julian Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT'L
L. 353, 372 (discussing how, "[e]ssentially, the argument for corporate liability under the ATS
rests on the failure of the U.S. courts even to spot the issue for decades. The long line of cases not
discussing the issue became, oddly, the precedent (even binding precedent in some cases) for
deciding that such liability was accepted.").
106. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11 th Cir. 2009).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1267.
109. Id. at 1263.
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viduals and corporations."' 10 The Court cited the Kadic holding that
"acts such as genocide and war crimes 'violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only
as private individuals.'""" The Court also referenced Romero and
Aldana: "[iln addition to private individual liability, we have also recog-
nized corporate defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and
may be liable for violations of the law of nations."
11 2
In Sinaltrainal, the Eleventh Circuit again avoided locating liability
in either international or domestic law by relying on precedent that never
resolved the issue. By using Kadic to discuss corporate liability, how-
ever, the Court seemed to suggest that corporations are just like any
other private actor, which Kadic had previously found liable under the
ATS. Ultimately, the Court's silence on how to frame the corporate lia-
bility question left it far from resolved.
B. The Second Circuit's Interpretation of Corporate Liability in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
Kiobel presented the first opportunity for the Second Circuit to
directly consider the question of whether corporations can be liable
under the ATS."13 The plaintiffs, Nigerian citizens, sued Dutch, British,
and Nigerian oil corporations (hereinafter referred to as "Royal Dutch"),
alleging they "aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing
human rights abuses."'1 4 The Kiobel majority interpreted footnote
twenty from Sosa and prior case law as situating liability under the ATS
in international law. The Court thereby explicitly answered the question
that had eluded other courts. Simultaneously, however, the Kiobel opin-
ion moved drastically away from cases that had previously upheld cor-
porate liability under the ATS."1 5
When addressing whether Royal Dutch could be liable, Judge
Cabranes' majority opinion noted: "the substantive law that determines
our jurisdiction under the ATS is neither the domestic law of the United
States nor the domestic law of any other country.... [T]he ATS requires
federal courts to look beyond the rules of domestic law-however well-
established they may be-to examine the specific and universally
accepted rules that the nations of the world treat as binding in their deal-
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)).
112. Id.
113. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).
114. Id. at 123.
115. See supra note 14; see also Murray et al., supra note 18, at 59 ("In almost all of the ATS
cases against corporations, the question of whether a corporation should be sued appears to have
been assumed, with neither defendants raising it as a concern, nor courts considering it.").
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ings with one another."'1 16 From this sentence, it is instantly apparent
that Judge Cabranes would situate the issue of corporate liability under
the ATS firmly in international law.
To begin his analysis, Judge Cabranes first cited Sosa's holding.
Although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute, "the drafters understood
that 'the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential for personal lia-
bility at the time."" 17 Courts must look to customary international law
to determine which narrow set of claims, based on "'norms of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a spec-
ificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the
Court had] recognized,"' support a cause of action under the ATS.
118
Judge Cabranes then took footnote twenty from Sosa and incorpo-
rated its text into his corporate liability analysis.119 Drawing from its
language, Judge Cabranes concluded "based on international law, Sosa,
and our own precedents-that international law, and not domestic law,
governs the scope of liability for violations of customary international
law under the ATS."' 12 To determine whether to take jurisdiction under
the ATS, courts must look "to customary international law to determine
both whether certain conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the
scope of liability under the ATS extends to the defendant being sued."''
In so holding, Judge Cabranes failed to fully address the private
actor/state actor language in footnote twenty. Footnote twenty can also
be interpreted as asking whether private actors can violate the given
international law norm at all, rather than questioning whether an interna-
tional law norm holds that private actor liable.' 22 As one article puts it,
"whether the norm of international law includes a state action require-
ment is a different question to whether international law itself holds per-
sons liable for breach of the norm. The first question, about norms, must
be answered by reference to international law; the second, regarding lia-
bility, will be resolved by federal courts applying federal common
law."'' 2 3 By rejecting this interpretation, Judge Cabranes situated the cor-
porate liability issue in international law.
116. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118.
117. Id. at 125 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004)).
118. Id. at 125-26 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725).
119. Sosa, 542 at 733 n.20. To recall, footnote twenty pondered "whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or an individual." Id.
120. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126.
121. Id. at 128.
122. Id. at 163-65 (Leval, J. concurring); see also Theophila, supra note 5, at 2902-2904;
Murray et al., supra note 18, at 78; Pariza, supra note 22, at 248.
123. Murray et al., supra note 18, at 78.
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To justify his interpretation, Judge Cabranes analyzed the subjects
of international law. Pointing to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, he emphasized that the subjects of international are those
entities that "'have legal status, personality, rights, and duties under
international law .... 11'124 International law only creates enforceable
obligations for those entities that it defines as international persons, and
those obligations must extend to the proposed defendant under the ATS
in order for the court to have jurisdiction.'25 In this case, if there is an
international law norm prohibiting the specific human rights violations
alleged, then corporations must also be "subjects of the customary inter-
national law of human rights" in order for the violations to be actionable
under the ATS. 126 The opinion thus aligned a defendant's liability under
the ATS with that defendant's liability under international law. As the
opinion would explain, corporate liability had to be rejected because
international human rights law has only extended its obligations to indi-
viduals and states.1
2 7
Judge Cabranes also cited Second Circuit precedent in support of
his interpretation of footnote twenty. He reiterated that footnote twenty
was an instruction to lower courts to "look to international law to deter-
mine [their] jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of
defendant, such as corporations. '2 8 Judge Cabranes found that this
"instruction . . . did not involve a revolutionary interpretation of the
statute - in fact, it had long been the law of this Circuit."' 129 He cited
Filartiga and Kadic for support, and found that each had searched inter-
national law to determine liability: "We have looked to international law
to determine whether state officials, see Filartiga .... [and] private indi-
viduals, see Kadic .... can be held liable under the ATS.
130
Though Judge Cabranes interpreted precedent as applying interna-
tional law to determine liability under the ATS, a different reading of the
case law suggests the opposite. As noted in Part I.A, the Filartiga court
did not necessarily look to international law to determine whether state
officials can be liable under the ATS. 131 While it held that official tor-
ture was a prohibited norm of customary international law, the Court did
not explicitly locate the liability of a state official for torture in intema-
124. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, pt.
R, at 70 introductory note (emphasis added)).
125. Id. at 126-27.
126. Id. at 126 n.28.
127. Id. at 127.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. at 130.
131. See infra Part I.A.
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tional law. Similarly, as noted in Part I.B, the Court in Kadic did not
necessarily look to international law to determine whether private indi-
viduals can be liable under the ATS.' 32 Kadic may have only recognized
that private actors, like state actors, can violate norms of international
law.
Turning to the case at hand, Judge Cabranes consulted the sources
of international law to determine whether there is a "norm of corporate
liability under customary international law."' 33 He found that "no inter-
national tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a corporation lia-
ble for a violation of the law of nations." '134 Indeed, the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, established by the London Charter,
exercised jurisdiction over "natural persons only."' 3 5 Judge Cabranes
therefore deduced that "corporate liability was not recognized as a 'spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory' norm of customary international law."' 36
As an example, he cited the "refusal of the military tribunal at Nurem-
berg to impose liability on I.G. Farben," a corporation that produced
substances used by the Nazis to perpetrate war crimes and crimes
against humanity.137
Judge Cabranes found that the absence of a customary international
law norm imposing liability on corporations persisted today, in light of
more recently established international tribunals, such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, neither of which extended jurisdiction to
corporations. 38 He further opined that the Rome Statute, which estab-
lished the International Criminal Court, explicitly limited its jurisdiction
to natural persons despite a proposal by the French delegation to include
juridical persons with its reach. "9 Judge Cabranes classified this as an
"express rejection ... of a norm of corporate liability in the context of
human rights violations."'
' 40
Lastly, international treaties and scholarly works are cited as proof
that no customary international law norm of corporate liability exists.
Although some international treaties impose liability on corporations,
Judge Cabranes found them insufficient to establish a customary rule of
international law. 141 The works of Professor James Crawford and Pro-
132. See infra Part I.B.
133. Id. at 131.
134. Id. at 132.
135. Id. at 133.
136. Id. at 136 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
137. Id. at 134.
138. Id. at 136-37.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 139.
141. Id. at 141.
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fessor Christopher Greenwood further confirmed "customary interna-
tional law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its
norms." 
14 2
Corporations therefore could not be liable under the ATS because
"customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of cor-
porate liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has
ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations."
1 43
The Court could not take jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiffs
had not alleged a violation of the law of nations. Under Kiobel then, no
matter how egregious a corporation's participation in human rights vio-
lations, victims can find no redress under the ATS unless and until cor-
porations are consistently and universally held liable on the international
plane.
III. BACKLASH IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AGAINST THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
Kiobel was the first Circuit court decision to explicitly reject corpo-
rate liability under the ATS; Seventh Circuit Judge Posner would later
call it an "outlier."'14 Subsequent decisions in the District of Columbia,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits called into question the Second Circuit's
reading of footnote twenty in Sosa and its overall interpretation of cor-
porate liability.'45 Judge Cabranes' application of international law
under the ATS created a backlash in these three Circuit courts and led to
a Circuit split. Part III will explore how the District of Columbia, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuit each addressed and rejected the Kiobel majority
opinion in their corporate liability decisions. These decisions illustrate
how a single judge's interpretation of the ATS changed the course of
developing law. Judge Cabranes' attempt to settle the corporate liability
issue in Kiobel revealed wide gaps in ATS jurisprudence and the need
for Supreme Court review.
A. The District of Columbia Circuit-Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
Less than a year after the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel, the
D.C. Circuit confronted the corporate liability question. The Doe plain-
tiffs, Indonesian villagers from the Aceh territory, sued Exxon Mobil
and its subsidiaries, alleging violations of the law of nations under the
142. Id. at 143-44.
143. Id. at 120.
144. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). Judge
Posner stated that "[a]ll but one of the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that
corporations can be liable." Id.
145. Id.; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
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ATS.146 The plaintiffs claimed they had suffered human rights violations
at the hands of members of the Indonesian military hired by Exxon to
provide security for the company at its Aceh facility. 4 7 The plaintiffs
appealed after the District Court dismissed their claims, and Exxon filed
a cross-appeal arguing for the first time that corporations could not be
liable under the ATS. 48 Exxon's argument that it was "entitled to corpo-
rate immunity because customary international law does not recognize
corporate liability for human rights violations" echoed the majority's
reasoning in Kiobel.'49
The D.C. Circuit rejected Exxon's argument. 5 ' The Court declined
to follow Kiobel "because its analysis conflates the norms of conduct at
issue in Sosa and the rules for any remedy to be found in federal com-
mon law at issue here; even on its own terms, its analysis misinterprets
the import of footnote 20 in Sosa and is unduly circumscribed in exam-
ining the sources of customary international law." 151 The D.C. Circuit
instead offered a different interpretation of the ATS and its jurispru-
dence that grounded corporate liability in domestic law.
The Court characterized corporate liability as an issue of remedy
for violations of "substantive international law norms" actionable under
the ATS.1 52 While Sosa explained that courts must look to international
law to determine whether the defendant's conduct constitutes a violation
of its norms, the question of corporate liability "is whether a corporation
can be made to pay damages for the conduct of its agents in violation of
the law of nations." '53 This is a question that the D.C. Circuit, unlike the
Second Circuit, found to be unanswered by Sosa.154 Because interna-
tional law leaves the matter of remedy to domestic law, "the law of the
United States and not the law of nations must provide the rule of deci-
sion in an ATS lawsuit."' 5 5 As such, domestic law governs corporate
liability, and domestic law "has been uniform since its founding that
corporations can be held liable for the torts committed by their
agents."
56
The D.C. Circuit's decision thus created a split with the Second
Circuit by offering a fundamentally different reading of corporate liabil-
146. Doe, 654 F.3d at 14-15.
147. Id. at 15.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 17.





155. Id. at 42.
156. Id. at 57.
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ity under the ATS. The Court stated: "The Second Circuit's approach
overlooks the key distinction between norms of conduct and remedies
... and instead conflates the norms and the rules (the technical accoutre-
ments) for any remedy found in federal common law. And in so doing,
the majority in Kiobel . . . misreads footnote 20 in Sosa, on which it
primarily relies .... ."57 The D.C. Circuit understood footnote twenty as
distinguishing between whether "certain forms of conduct were viola-
tions of international law when done by a state actor. . . and not when
done by a private actor." '58 For the court, the key distinction in footnote
twenty is between private actors and state actors. 59 If private actors can
violate international law norms, then corporations, as private actors, can
too.
B. The Seventh Circuit-Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.
Judge Posner's ruling in Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.
widened the Circuit split by upholding corporate liability under the ATS
and relying on domestic law, much like the D.C. Circuit. In Flomo,
twenty-three Liberian children sued Firestone Natural Rubber Co.
("Firestone") for using hazardous child labor on their rubber plantation
in Liberia, in violation of the law of nations. 160 The plaintiffs appealed
to the Seventh Circuit after the District Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Firestone.
161
Although Judge Posner ultimately found that the hazardous child
labor conditions alleged by the plaintiffs did not rise to the level of cus-
tomary international law violations, 62 he nonetheless addressed the
issue of corporate liability under the ATS and found "no objection" to
it. 163 Judge Posner rejected Firestone's argument, which echoed the
majority's reasoning in Kiobel, "that because corporations, unlike indi-
viduals, have never been prosecuted for criminal violations of customary
international law, there cannot be a norm, let alone a 'universal' one,
forbidding them to commit crimes against humanity and other acts that
the civilized world abhors."
' 164
Judge Posner found that "[t]he factual premise of the majority opin-




160. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).
161. Id. at 1015.
162. Id. at 1021-23.
163. Id. at 1021.
164. Id. at 1017.
165. Id. at 1017.
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their history wrong because the "allied powers dissolved German corpo-
rations that had assisted the Nazi war effort, along with Nazi govern-
ment and party organizations-and they did so on the authority of
customary international law."' 16 6 Regardless, even if "no corporation had
ever been punished for violating customary international law ... [t]here
is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm."' 67
Judge Posner delineated a "distinction between a principle of [cus-
tomary international] law, which is a matter of substance, and the means
of enforcing it, which is a matter of procedure or remedy."'168 To Posner,
"[i]nternational law imposes substantive obligations and the individual
nations decide how to enforce them." 169 An example illuminated this
principle:
If a corporation has used slave labor at the direction of its board of
directors, then whether the board members should be prosecuted as
criminal violators of customary international law-or also or instead
be forced to pay damages, compensatory and perhaps punitive as
well, to the slave laborers-or, again also or instead, whether the
corporation should be prosecuted criminally and/or subjected to tort
liability-all these would be remedial questions for the tribunal, in
this case our federal judiciary, to answer in light of its experience
with particular remedies and its immersion in the nation's legal cul-
ture, rather than questions the answer to which could be found in
customary international law.
170
Judge Posner would have courts turn to domestic law to decide whether
and to what extent to hold corporations liable for violations of custom-
ary international law norms. He highlighted this point with "treaties that
explicitly authorize national variation in methods of enforcing custom-
ary international law."'171 Where the Kiobel majority went wrong, then,
was by looking to international law to determine whether corporate lia-
bility constituted a customary international law norm. 172 As one scholar
points out, the Flomo court "criticize[s] the majority in Kiobel for failing
to distinguish between the norm of international law relevant to estab-
lishing the requisite conduct and the rules of remedy (determined by US
federal common law). 173
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1019.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1019-20.
171. Id. at 1020.
172. Id. at 1019. Posner went on to state: "If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such
violations was itself a norm of international law, no claims under the Alien Tort Statute could ever
be successful, even claims against individuals; only the United States, as far as we know, has a
statute that provides a civil remedy for violations of customary international law." Id.
173. Justine Nolan, A Response to Odette Murray, David Kinley and Chip Pitts, OPioJuRs
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C. The Ninth Circuit-Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh, D.C., and
Seventh Circuits in upholding corporate liability under the ATS in Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC.'74 While the D.C. and Seventh Circuits upheld corpo-
rate liability by applying domestic law, the Ninth Circuit did so by
applying international law instead. In Sarei, the plaintiffs, current and
former residents of the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea,
sued Rio Tinto mining group under the ATS. 7 5 The plaintiffs alleged
that Rio Tinto's operations in Bougainville led to violations of interna-
tional law committed against them, including genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and racial discrimination.
76
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the ATS itself bars
corporations from all liability.1 77 The Court relied on the concurring
opinion in Kiobel, which found that "no principle of domestic or interna-
tional law supports the majority's conclusion that the norms enforceable
through the ATS-such as the prohibition by international law of geno-
cide, slavery, war crimes, piracy, etc.-apply only to natural persons
and not to corporations, leaving corporations immune from suit and free
to retain profits earned through such acts."' 178 The Court further found
that the text of the ATS itself and its legislative history provide no com-
plete bar to corporate liability, citing the D.C. Circuit opinion in Doe for
support. 179
The Court then looked to international law and found that Sosa
required "an international-law inquiry specific to each cause of action
asserted." 8' For each claimed violation of a customary international law
norm under the ATS, then, the Court must "consider separately each
violation of international law alleged and which actors may violate
it.""'8 The Court then applied this analysis to each alleged violation of
customary international law.
The Court's analysis of the plaintiff's genocide claim is illustrative
of this framework. The Court first held that the prohibition against geno-
cide is an "internationally accepted norm," the violation of which is
(Dec. 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/08/a-response-to-odette-murray-david-
kinley-and-chip-pitts-by-justine-nolanl.
174. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
175. Id. at 742.
176. Id. at 742-43.
177. Id. at 747.
178. Id. (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 153 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval,
J. concurring)).
179. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748 (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
180. Id. at 748.
181. Id.
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actionable under the ATS.18 2 Using the Sosa standard,183 the Court
found evidence in the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute, and procla-
mations of the ICJ that genocide amounts to an international norm.
184
The Court then looked to international law to determine whether it holds
corporations liable for genocide. 185 Drawing from the ICJ, the Court
found evidence of corporate liability in international law.' 86
By keeping the corporate liability analysis in international law, the
Ninth Circuit did not stray so far from Kiobel as the Seventh and D.C.
Circuits had. The Court stated that, "[w]e, like the Second Circuit, have
also taken guidance for our analysis from a footnote in Sosa and asked
'whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued."" 87 But, rather than look-
ing to see whether international law had ever held a corporation liable
for a violation of an international law norm, the Court asked "whether
international law extends its prohibitions to the perpetrators in
question."188
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON CORPORATE LIABILITY-JUDGES AS
READERS OF THE ATS
In his essay titled Law as Interpretation, Ronald Dworkin com-
pares judges' opinions to a chain literary exercise in which a group of
novelists join together to collectively write a novel. 189 In the chain exer-
cise, each novelist writes a piece of the novel and passes it on to the
next, "interpreting and creating" as they go. 9 ' Dworkin explains his
comparison of novelists in the chain exercise to judges engaged in legal
analysis:
[e]ach judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or she must read
through what other judges in the past have written not simply to dis-
cover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they
said it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collec-
182. Id. at 758.
183. Under Sosa, plaintiffs must plead a violation of a "'specific, universal, and obligatory"'
international norm in order for the court to take jurisdiction under the ATS. Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing In re Estate of Marcos Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994)).
184. Sarei, 671 F. 3d at 758-59.
185. Id. at 759-61.
186. Id. The Court found that the ICJ had held that "an amorphous group, a state, and a private
individual may all violate the jus cogens norms prohibiting genocide," thus "corporations likewise
can commit genocide under international law because the prohibition is universal." Id. at 761.
187. Id. at 760 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20)).
188. Id. at 760-61.
189. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 540-43 (1982).
190. Id. at 541.
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tively done, in the way that each of our novelists formed an opinion
about the collective novel so far written .... Each judge must regard
himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a com-
plex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, struc-
tures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to
continue that history into the future through what he does on the day.
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibil-
ity to advance the enterprise at hand rather than to strike out in some
new direction of his own.' 9 1
Dworkin illustrates his theory with an example of an Illinois judge
who must decide whether an aunt can recover from a negligent driver for
emotional harm she suffered upon hearing on the telephone that her
niece (or nephew) had been run over by a car. 19 2 In Dworkin's hypothet-
ical, the Supreme Court of Illinois had previously ruled that "a negligent
driver who ran down a child was liable for the emotional damage suf-
fered by the child's mother, who was standing next to the child on the
road."'193 Based on this precedent, the judge may be forced to choose
between two interpretations: (1) "negligent drivers are responsible to
those whom their behavior is likely to cause physical harm . . . for
whatever injury-physical or emotional-they in fact cause; or (2)
"negligent drivers are responsible for any damage they can reasonably
be expected to foresee if they think about their behavior in advance." '94
The latter interpretation would find the defendant liable to the aunt,
while the former would not.' 95 In this hypothetical case, the judge "must
decide which of these two principles represents the better 'reading' of
the chain of decisions he must continue."'
196
Dworkin's theory of legal analysis can be used as a framework for
understanding the development of the corporate liability issue under the
ATS. Each judge struggled to advance and develop legal analysis of a
defendant's liability in light of the new contexts in which these cases
were brought over time-beginning with suits against state actors,
197
then against private actors, 198 and finally against corporations.' 99 Each
judge passed along his interpretation of international law, the rights vin-
dicated and obligations imposed by the ATS, the text and history of the
191. Id. at 542-43.
192. Id. at 529.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 543.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
198. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
199. See, e.g. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
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statute, and precedent, each changing and developing the law as the clas-
ses of defendants expanded.
Dworkin's theory also elucidates how the Second Circuit arrived at
its interpretation of corporate liability in Kiobel. Judge Cabranes was
able to interpret corporate liability the way he did based on prior analy-
ses of liability under the ATS. 2° Prior decisions left open and unan-
swered the choice of law question. While previous judges had applied
international law to determine a plaintiff's rights under the ATS, they
left gaps in their interpretations of a defendant's liability.
The language of footnote twenty in Sosa also gave the Kiobel Court
an opportunity, as Dworkin would have it, to determine what it believed
to be the "better 'reading"' of corporate liability.2"' Because prior deci-
sions had failed to situate a defendant's liability in either international or
domestic law, the Kiobel Court was able to choose a theory "about the
'meaning' of that chain of decisions"2 2 grounded firmly in international
law. The Supreme Court's phrasing of footnote twenty allowed for this
interpretation.20 3 Read literally, the footnote can be interpreted just as
Kiobel did,204 requiring judges to determine whether customary interna-
tional law has extended liability to the perpetrator being sued in each
case. 20
5
As discussed in Part HI, the Kiobel opinion set off a backlash
among other Circuit courts. Each of these post-Kiobel decisions inter-
preted precedent and the impact of Sosa differently. 206 The D.C. Circuit
in Doe and the Seventh Circuit in Flomo directly opposed Kiobel by
applying domestic law to the corporate liability question,20 7 while the
200. See supra Part I.B.
201. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 543.
202. Id.
203. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20 ("A related consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant
is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.").
204. See Murray et al., supra note 18, at 60 (discussing how footnote twenty "lends
ammunition to the argument that the 'scope of liability' for a violation of international law
pursuant to the ATS - as regards which perpetrators may be held liable (that is, only state actors,
or also non-state actors) - must be determined by international law. This footnote has been used
by both district and circuit courts to frame a 'choice of law' debate.").
205. The literal definition of liability also lends support to this view: "The quality or state of
being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by
civil remedy or criminal punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
206. See generally supra Part HI.
207. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("That the ATS provides
federal jurisdiction where the conduct at issue fits a norm qualifying under Sosa implies that for
purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law of nations
must provide the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit."); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,
643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) ("International law imposes substantive obligations and the
individual nations decide how to enforce them.").
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Ninth Circuit in Sarei applied international law. 218 While the D.C. and
Seventh Circuits both acknowledged that international law extends the
same obligations to corporations that it does to private individuals, 209 the
Courts rested their holdings on corporate liability in domestic, rather
than international, law. The Ninth Circuit, however, used footnote
twenty in much the same way that Kiobel did, yet it reached the opposite
result.
210
These differing interpretations of corporate liability highlight the
gaps in ATS case law, left behind since Filartiga and Kadic, and wid-
ened by the murky language of footnote twenty in Sosa.11 In his essay,
Dworkin explains how a judge's interpretation of the law along the
"chain enterprise" necessarily includes a political element.2 12 He states:
Judges develop a particular approach to legal interpretation by
forming and refining a political theory sensitive to those issues on
which interpretation in particular cases will depend; they call this
their legal philosophy. It will include both structural features, elabo-
rating the general requirement that an interpretation must fit doctrinal
history, and substantive claims about social goals and principles of
justice. Any judge's opinion about the best interpretation will there-
fore be the consequence of beliefs other judges need not share.213
The Kiobel Court similarly incorporated a policy against corporate lia-
bility into its decision by using legal interpretation. As one article stated,
"the theory that deeper policy rationales and general opposition to the
ATS informed the majority opinion in Kiobel received resounding con-
firmation with the issue of the judgment denying the plaintiffs petition
for panel rehearing on 4 February 201 1.
' 214
V. INTERPRETING FOOTNOTE TWENTY AND THE ATS TODAY
America has been a staunch protector of the rule of law. The case
before the Supreme Court reminds me that [sic] of the difference
between "negative peace" and "positive peace." The absence of
human rights crimes is negative peace, but the presence of justice
indicates positive peace. In a positive-peace society, the Alien Tort
Statute shows that the rights of the most disenfranchised and
208. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2011)
209. See Id. at 761 ("Both courts [the D.C. and Seventh Circuits] noted that, while I.G. Farben
was not criminally prosecuted after World War II, it was dissolved and it's [sic] assets seized.").
210. Id. at 760-61.
211. One commentator warned of this type of gap filling in ATS jurisprudence before the
Second Circuit decided Kiobel. See Ku, supra note 105, at 35-36.
212. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 543.
213. Id. at 545.
214. Murray et al., supra note 18, at 89-90 (citing Kiobel Panel Rehearing (2d Cir., No. 06-
4800-cv, Feb. 4, 2011)).
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oppressed are just as important as the rights of the richest and most
powerful.215
On October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted the Kiobel Plain-
tiffs' petition for certiorari.216 In its reading of the previous "chain of
decisions" 21 7 under the ATS, the Supreme Court should now apply
domestic law to the corporate liability issue. The Court should interpret
precedent and footnote twenty from Sosa to incorporate a policy of
international corporate responsibility into the ATS. By locating a defen-
dant's liability in domestic law, the Court would eliminate the possibil-
ity that corporations could escape liability for human rights violations by
virtue of the mere fact that they are corporations.
On December 21, 2011, the United States filed a Brief as Amicus
Curiae in support of the Plaintiffs,218 which provides a framework
through which the Court should now determine corporate liability under
the ATS.2"9 In its Brief, the United States called Kiobel a misreading of
international law and footnote twenty from Sosa,220 and urged that
215. Desmond Tutu, Desmond Tutu: Will U.S. rule for rights of S. Africans?, Columnists'
Opinions, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlstory/opinion/2012/
09/30/desmond-tutu-supreme-court-south-african/ 1603943!.
216. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011).
217. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 543.
218. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6425363 (Dec 21,
2011).
219. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on the corporate liability issue on February 28,
2012. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d Ill (2d
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491). On Mar. 5, 2012, the Court issued an Order expanding the question
presented. See Order for Reargument, 132 S.Ct. 1738 (Mar. 5, 2012). The Court ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: "Whether and under what
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than
the United States." Id. The United States filed a Supplemental Brief answering this question in the
negative, which, if followed, would ultimately lead to an outcome for the Defendants based on the
extraterritoriality issue. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial
Support of Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No.
10-1491), 2012 WL 2161290 (Jun. 11, 2012). Interestingly, the United States maintained its
original position in support of the Plaintiffs on the corporate liability issue. Id. at 27. The United
States would therefore leave open the possibility that a proper ATS defendant might include a
U.S. corporation or a foreign corporation where the alleged conduct occurred within the United
States or on the high seas. Id. at 21. The Court heard re-argument on October 1, 2012, and a final
decision is expected in 2013. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d Ill (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491). While extraterritoriality is beyond the scope of
this Note, the broadening of the question presented gives the Court an opportunity to avoid
resolving the corporate liability issue altogether if it decides that the ATS does not apply
extraterritorially. Even if the Court rules against extraterritorial application, it should nevertheless
side with the United States' position on corporate liability and hold that domestic law applies. As
such, the Court would both avoid future uncertainty on whether corporations are proper ATS
defendants and leave room for future lawsuits against them in narrow circumstances.
220. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal
[Vol. 67:705
2013] INTERPRETING LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 735
"[w]hether corporations should be held accountable for those violations
[of international law norms] in private tort suits under the ATS is a ques-
tion of federal common law."' 22 ' This argument largely tracks those
courts and commentators who have said that international law applies
only when determining whether a defendant's conduct violates a sub-
stantive international law norm. Courts first "must conduct a norm-by-
norm assessment to determine whether the actor being sued is within the
scope of the identified norm. '22 2 Depending on whether the defendant is
a private or state actor, courts will look to the substantive norm of inter-
national law to see if it applies. For example, if the defendant is a private
actor, "the court must consider whether private actors are capable of
violating the international-law norm at issue.'"223
The United States then argued that, "[o]nce it is established that the
international norm applies to conduct by an actor, it is largely up to each
state to determine for itself whether and how that norm should be
enforced in its domestic law."' 224 A defendant's liability under the ATS
is thus decided and governed by domestic law. Because corporations are
considered persons under domestic law and are "capable of being sued
in tort," they may also be liable under the ATS.225 For the United States,
international law in fact supports a finding of corporate liability because
"[b]oth natural persons and corporations can violate international-law
norms that require state action. And both natural persons and corpora-
tions can violate international-law norms that do not require state
action. 226
The ATS sets the United States apart as one of the only forums in
the world to offer civil redress for human rights violations committed
worldwide. As history and the development of case law under the ATS
demonstrate, corporations have become increasingly implicated in
human rights violations. By allowing corporate lawsuits under the ATS
to be considered, we will incentivize corporations to promote respect for
human rights globally. The Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel should
therefore use domestic law to link a defendant's obligation under inter-
national law to its liability under the ATS. Kiobel is an opportunity to
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6425363 (Dec 21,
2011), at 18.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 18.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id. at 26.
226. Id. at 21; see also Id. at 27-31.
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use the ATS as a beacon of leadership in the human rights field and to
show other nations that human rights abusers will be held responsible
for their actions. The opportunity should not be missed.
